Since a law is passed by the Crown for its subjects, there is a presumption that a statute does not bind the Crown. The Crown, by passing a statute, does not wish to harm his own interest nor does he wish to interfere with his own rights. Therefore, the normal presumptions that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless so is provided by express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. T. Vat p. 232
Presumption extends to the Crown’s servants and agents also but there are many persons and bodies whose position as servants or agents of the Crown is not altogether clear and their liability depends on the nature of the function performed by the person or body in questions. Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition), p. 162 The Crown may be held to be bound by a statute in the following four cases:
- Where the Crown is clearly bound by a provision in which it is expressly stated to be bound;
- Where the intention bind the Crown is manifest;
- Where the prerogative, rights or property of the Crown are not in question; and
- Where a statute is for advancement of religion or learning and for the maintenance of the poor, or for suppression of wrong, or for performing the will of a donor. Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition), p. 166, 167
It was observed by the court that since laws are made by rulers for subjects a general expression in a statute such as ‘any person’, descriptive of those upon whom the statute imposes obligations or restraints, is not to be read as including the ruler himself. The court, however, held that since the appellants are an independent body corporate not exercising functions created by the government, they are liable to pay income tax. But with the passing of the Crown proceedings Act, 1947 the area of liability of the Crown has been widened very considerably. Similarly, in matters of limitation also the previous position has almost been reversed and now, except in certain exceptional circumstances, proceedings by or against the Crown are subject to the law of limitation. British Broadcasting Corporation v. Johns (Inspector of Taxes), (1965) Ch 32, quoted by Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition), p. 161
The Privy Council held that the Common Law principle that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless he is expressly or by necessary implication made to be so is applicable to India also. Bombay Province v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1947) PC 34; Director of Research, and Development v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR (1960) SC 1355
It was observed by the Supreme Court of India, by majority, that since the provisions of section 386 (1) (a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 (corresponding to section 437 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951) neither by express terms nor by necessary implication bind the government, the prosecution of the Government of West Bengal through one of its officers under section 488 of Bengal Act, 1923, for using certain premises for storing rice etc., without a licence under section186 is not maintainable. The rule that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is provided by express terms or by necessary implications is a good law in India also. The English rule has not been changed by the Constitution which can be cited in support of the proposition that the position has changed after the republican form of government has been adumbrated by the Constitution of India. The immunity of the government from the operation of certain statutes, and particularly those creating offences, is based on the fundamental concept that the government or its officers cannot be a party to committing a crime analogous to the prerogative of perfection that the King can do no wrong. It was further emphasized that far from the Constitution marking any change in the legal position, it has clearly indicated that the laws in force, which expression must be interpreted as including the common law of this country before the Constitution came into force, continue to have validity, even in the new set up, except in so far as they come in conflict with the express provisions of the Constitution. Director of Research, and Development v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR (1960) SC 1355
The Supreme Court held in that the contention that a State is not bound by a statute unless it is named therein expressly or by necessary implication, and as there is no mention of a State in specific terms in Order IXL, Rule 2 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a State cannot, as such, be proceeded against disobedience of an order of a court, cannot be accepted. The State is bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the scheme of the code being that subject to any special provision made in that regard, as respects governments, it occupies the same position as any other party to a proceeding before the court. Even apart from the scheme of the Code, the State as a party defendant is plainly within the terms of O. Order IXL, Rule 2 (3) of the Code. State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari, AIR (1961) SC 221
It was observed by the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of India that, the rule that the State is not bound, unless it is expressly named in the statute or the same necessarily implies, is one of interpretation. In considering the true meaning of words or expressions used by the legislature the court must have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. The court must ascertain the intention of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. Again, in interpreting a constitutional document provisions conferring legislative power must normally be interpreted liberally and in their widest amplitude. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR (1963) SC 1241
The Supreme Court of India reiterated the principle that a statute does not bind the crown except by express provision of that effect or by necessary implication and held that if the State carries on business at a particular place, a suit against it would lie at that place as per section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as is done against private parties. Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, AIR (1963) SC 1681
The Supreme Court of India held that the rule adopted in the United Kingdom, viz., that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication is still applicable to Indian subject to the modification that the expression Crown or King in the rule has to be understood as referring to the executive government of the State in the context of Constitution of India. The rule is merely one of construction which raises an initial presumption in its favour. It is a rule intended to give effect to the intentions of the legislature and consequently, if there is either in the purpose of the Act or in its provisions a manifestation of a clear intention to the contrary, the presumption would be rebutted and the Sl.ite would be bound. The intention to bind would also be clearly made out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated unless the government was bound. The mere fact that certain artificial entities like corporations are brought within the scope of the Act would not by itself rebut the presumptive role of construction that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is brought within its scope expressly or by necessary implication. State of Punjab v. OCB Syndicate Limited, AIR (1964) SC 669
It was stated by the Supreme Court of India that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule, it obviously necessary that the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature by considering all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute between the parties. In dealing with this vexed question sometimes it is necessary also to inquire whether the conclusion that the State is not bound by the specific provision of a given statute would hamper the working of the statute or would lead to the anomalous position that the statute may lose its efficacy, and if the answer to either of these two questions indicates that the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced against the State, the court would be inclined to infer by necessary implication that the State, in fact, is bound by the statute. Where, however, the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute, but whether it can claim the benefit of a statute, the same rule of construction may have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the public good, and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good, it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature was to make the relevant provisions applicable to the State. Up to this year the Supreme Court seems to have followed consistently the English presumption that the State is not bound by a statute unless the statute expressly so provides or it is necessarily concluded by implication. But the following cases will show that there has been an abrupt change in the attitude of the Supreme Court and the position has been reversed. The Supreme Court now says that the State is as much bound by a statute as anyone else except when it is unambiguously provided that the State in not so bound or the same is deducible by necessary implication. V. S. Rice and Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1964) SC 1781
The Supreme Court of India, by majority, held that the rule of construction that the Crown is not bound by a statute save by express provision or necessary implication was not accepted as a rule of construction thoughout India and even in the presidency towns it was not regarded as a rule of construction. It has not become a law of the land. Even assuming that the rule had been accepted as a rule of construction throughout India, it cannot be called the law of the land after the Constitution came into force. It is true that the expression ‘law in force’ in article 372 of the Constitution includes not only enactments of the Indian legislatures but also the common law of the land which was being administered by the courts in India. But a canon of construction and a law are two different things and a rule of construction cannot be called a ‘law in force’. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR (1967) SC 997
The Supreme Court of India held that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 applies equally to the State also on the same lines as it does to private bodies, statutory authorities and semi-government organizations because the Act nowhere expressly or impliedly that it exempts the State from its purview. Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta, AIR (1994) SC 787
The Supreme Court of India was seized of interpreting section 3 (1) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulations, 1959. Linder this provision no ‘person’ is authorized to transfer any land in the scheduled area to a non-tribal person. The Supreme Court while interpreting the word ‘person’ in this provision held that the ‘government’ is also included within the word ‘person’ and as such even the government cannot transfer land in the scheduled area to a non-tribal person. Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1997) SC 3297
